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Low intensity conflict in MNCs 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – Inter-unit conflict in MNCs is an important and well-researched theme. However, while 
most studies have focused on open conflicts acknowledged by both headquarters and subsidiaries, 
much less research has dealt with low intensity conflicts caused by power asymmetries. Still, low 
intensity conflicts can be highly damaging – not least because they are rarely resolved. Thus, we set 
out to identify why and in which form low intensity conflict develops, as perceived by low power 
subsidiary representatives, in the interaction between MNC headquarters and subsidiaries. 
Design/methodology/approach – We use a qualitative approach to understand low intensity conflict 
relying on 170 interviews in four Danish MNCs. 
Findings – We describe antecedents of low intensity conflict and identify four types of actions by HQ 
representatives that can lead to the development of such conflicts, namely ignoring, bypassing, 
assuming, and educating. 
Originality/value – Very few studies have dealt with low intensity conflict – not least in international 
business research. We argue that the study of low intensity conflict in MNCs can provide us with 
relevant, novel knowledge of MNC functioning. 
 
Keywords MNC, International business, Conflict, HQ-subsidiary relations 
Paper type Research paper 
 
Introduction 
Employees in different MNC units often operate in highly dissimilar institutional 
environments (Harzing and Sorge, 2003) facing more or less contradictory institutional 
pressures (Molina, 2012). This can lead to differences in interests on the basis of which 
conflicts may develop (Blazejewski, 2012). Such conflicts are especially likely to escalate in 
situations where geographical, cultural, and linguistic distance as well as power asymmetries 
exist between the parties – as is often the case in MNCs (Gammelgaard, Kumar and Worm, 
2013; Lauring and Klitmøller, 2015). 
 
While conflict between individuals in different MNC units has been well-covered in existing 
research (Schotter and Beamish, 2011), less attention has been paid to the intensity of the 
conflict. In this article we therefore aim at exploring a relatively understudied theme in 
international business conflict literature, namely that of low intensity conflict that has been 
mentioned in existing literature but has not yet been systematically examined. For example, 
2 
 
Blazejewski (2006) studied conflict in a German MNC and found not only open conflict but 
also avoidance of open confrontation and conflicts that were hidden, i.e. ‘below-the-line’. In a 
recent publication Bjerregaard and Klitmøller (2016) mention the mundane struggles and 
resistance expressed as silent conflict in a Mexican subsidiary of a Danish MNC. This 
resonates well with a statement by Kolb and Putnam (1992) that conflict, although not always 
directly observable, is a persistent fact of organizational life, deeply embedded in the very 
fabric of social encounters. Hence, it may be argued that since conflict is ever present, much 
of it is expressed in a low intensity form enacted as avoidance, alliance forming, gossip, 
conspiracies, and subtle vengeance directed activities (Kolb and Putnam, 1992) or as ‘below-
the-line venting of frustration’ (Blazejewski, 2006: 87). This form of conflict is thoroughly 
described by Scott’s (1987) classical anthropological study on ‘weapons of the weak’ 
describing patient and silent acts of resistance among low power groups. Scott’s work on low 
intensity conflict is based on an idea of power asymmetries between different parties. While 
the power relation between headquarters (HQ) and subsidiaries is often complex (Kristensen 
and Zeitlin, 2005), in line with Scott (1987) we propose that low intensity conflicts may arise 
and persist when one party feels inferior to the other. We do recognize that HQs may have 
good reasons for maintaining a position that could lead to low intensity conflict behavior 
among subsidiary employees. Nonetheless, in the current article we argue that the existence of 
such conflicts can have negative consequences for MNCs and as such should not be ignored. 
 
Hence, the aim of this article is to build on theoretical notions of low intensity conflict and 
empirically examine why and in which form they may develop as perceived by subsidiary 
representatives in the interaction between individuals in MNC HQs and subsidiaries. 
 
Literature review 
In this section we first describe how power asymmetry can affect relations between members 
of HQ and subsidiaries. We then proceed to outline how this can cause conflict between 
members in the different MNC units. Finally, we discuss the different levels of conflict stating 
that our focus will be on low intensity conflict with distributed interests. In this study the 
focus is specifically on low intensity conflict in situations where the subsidiary is of lower 
power than HQ. 
 
Power asymmetry between MNC units 
A number of studies have focused on power-dependence and the interaction between 
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members of MNC units (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). 
According to this literature, individuals in less powerful MNC units have interests in 
autonomy that allows them to discover and pursue distinct business opportunities which will 
result in a more beneficial position (Dörrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2011). Moreover, 
although they share ownership and the overall purpose and aim with the MNC that they are 
part of, the different units are also rent-seeking entities that pursue private benefits; for 
instance in terms of the allocation of strategic investments or other benefits (Andersson, 
Forsgren and Holm, 2007). The pursuit of different goals among various MNC units can often 
lead to divergent perceptions of other units, their aims and role. Such perception gaps can be 
linked to asymmetrical power relations within the MNC.  
 
Although there is considerable power vested in the formal role of HQ, a constant bargaining 
for influence between HQ and subsidiaries takes place, and distribution of power is 
determined by a number of factors (Andersson et al., 2007). For example, subsidiary power 
can be connected to units’ ability to influence HQs in their strategic and operational decision-
making activities (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2011). This ability, in turn, is determined 
by different factors, including the extent to which a subsidiary creates knowledge that is 
valuable for HQ and other MNC units (Mudambi and Navarro, 2004). Local market 
characteristics, including the strategic importance and level of competitiveness, are also 
mentioned as sources of subsidiary influence. Andersson et al. (2007) discusses subsidiary 
influence as determined by the strategic importance of the subsidiary’s local market coupled 
with the closeness of the subsidiary’s relations with that market. The authors also recognize 
that HQ’s own knowledge of local markets may counteract the extent to which local market 
knowledge may serve as a source of subsidiary power.   
 
Although subsidiaries often develop strategies to diminish power asymmetry in favor of HQ, 
HQ’s fear of subsidiary subversive strategies still influences inter-unit relations in many 
MNCs leading to control initiatives from HQ representatives (Delany, 2000). The resulting 
dominating power base allows HQ managers to misrecognize subsidiary managers’ 
perceptions of HQ’s dependency of the subsidiary unit. Linking perception gaps to 
domination, it may be argued that low power MNC unit employees may not have the 
sufficient power to engage in open conflict and thus may have to resort to subtler forms of 
conflict activities such as discrediting high power individuals when they are not present. Also, 
the low power unit members may choose to turn to what Morrison and Milliken (2000) call 
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‘organizational silence’ as speaking up is perceived to be both ‘useless and even dangerous’ 
(p. 722). In this regard Ferner et al. (2004) describe how English subsidiary managers 
experienced how the word ‘no’ was not to be used in interaction with their American HQ 
counterparts (p. 382). If low power MNC unit members are not able to protest to high power 
unit members, then it is likely that conflict may develop even though this is not always 
apparent to the high power individual. 
 
Conflict  
Conflict develops when the implementation of one individual or group’s selected alternative 
impedes on or is hindered in its realization by other individuals or groups’ interests (Greer, 
Caruso and Jehn, 2011; Blazejewski, 2012). Moreover, a conflict exists if two parties’ 
interests and scopes of action collide, and if this collision is perceived by at least one of the 
actors involved (Jehn, Rispens and Thatcher, 2010). Fundamentally, the behavioral driver of 
the conflict can be rooted in perceptual differences among constituents which share the same 
organizational goal. These conflicts may follow from, for instance, insufficient information or 
differences in mental models. This type of conflict differs from conflicts of interest where 
actors hold incompatible views with respect to the goal of the organization and how to reach 
these (Pahl and Roth, 1993). 
 
Conflicts can arise in relation to actions taken or actions not taken by the other actor. Both 
situations can cause conflict behavior. In addition conflict may arise in relation to close 
interaction (conflicts become evident) and in relation to avoidance of contact (stereotypes 
thrive) (Halperin, Sharvit and Gross, 2011). This can also be related to action theory (Wilson 
and Shpall, 2012) in philosophy stating that conflict may be looked upon in the light of 
willful/non-willful action as well as activation/pacification. Hence, it may be argued that in an 
MNC context conflict could be understood from an intension as well as an interaction 
perspective as two underlying dimensions. The negative effect of that process has been shown 
to be even greater when involving distant parties as e.g. members of different MNC business 
units (Jarvenpaa, Shaw and Staples, 2004). 
 
Conflictual events are experienced individually. However, even if conflict situations are only 
felt directly by few individual group members, they are often subsequently communicated and 
thus transmitted to other group members (Mackie, Devos and Smith, 2000). Group 
identification can then sometimes over time affect the whole unit so that the same emotions 
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will develop in all individual members to a greater or lesser extent (Smith, 1993; Lauring, 
2008). Hence, conflicts in MNCs are not actual conflicts between units as organizational 
entities but between individuals socially ordered by organizational structure as well as by 
geographical, cultural, and linguistic distance (Klitmøller and Lauring, 2016). 
 
Level of conflict 
A review of research on conflict literature describes different levels or degrees of conflict 
intensity, ranging from high to low intensity conflicts which differ both with respect to 
antecedent conditions driving the behavior of the actors and the type of dissent reflected in the 
conflictual behavior (Katz and Kahn, 1978; Ellegaard and Andersen, 2015). Figure 1 outlines 
a model describing behavioral drivers and conflict intensity as underlying dimensions in the 
outline of four different types of high and low intensity conflict.  
 
***Insert figure 1 *** 
 
High intensity conflicts in MNCs and other organizations are recognized and typically openly 
voiced by most if not by all organizational members. In cell A, high intensity conflict with 
integrated interests at the core, is theoretically possible, but is unlikely as the distribution of 
opposing interests is a main driver of conflict intensity. We describe them as paradoxical 
conflicts, as they represent a fundamental schism in a complex of interests held by one actor. 
The type of conflict found in cell B, high intensity conflicts between distributed interests, on 
the other hand, are manifest on several organizational levels ranging from personal to intra-
organizational units, suggesting negative attitudes on both sides of the conflicting parties 
(such as suspicion, disassociation, and hostility), and conflictual behaviors characterized by 
careful rationing and distortion of information as well as a strong degree of formalism and 
rigidity (Roth and Nigh, 1992). Such conflicts can be labelled open as they are voiced, and as 
the camps of interest are often manifest among MNC constitutents. Divergent opinions 
regarding standardization vs. localization decisions is an area that has been described to cause 
open conflict between different MNC unit representatives (Solberg, 2000) e.g. with regard to 
HRM policies (Ferner et al., 2004; Lauring, 2013). 
 
Low intensity conflict, on the other hand, can be described as conflict that is not directly and 
openly voiced by any of the involved parties, and most often the importance of the conflict 
theme is not equally acknowledged by all parties. Low intensity conflict between integrated 
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interests (cell C) describes ongoing tensions relating to, for instance, prioritizations that will 
occur in any organizational relationship on a continuous basis and do not necessarily call for 
any further action. Schotter and Beamish (2011) argue that conflict in the relationship 
between members of different organizational units can be triggered by a multitude of factors 
including market and customer preferences, strategic misalignments, global and local 
competitors’ strategies, asymmetries between local and global industry dynamics, managerial 
self-interests, and personal characteristics of the individuals involved. Typically, they are 
resolved through a broad spectrum of repairing interaction scripts (Dirks, Lewicki and Zaheer, 
2009). 
 
However, although low intensity conflicts are subtler and less action-oriented than open 
conflicts, they are not always benevolent, as suggested by cell D in figure 1. We label these 
suppressed conflicts, and they are our main interest here. Like high intensity conflict, low 
intensity conflict may be derived from a fundamental disagreement of interests, which is not 
widely shared and even suppressed by those involved, due to issues such as strong power 
asymmetries in the intra-organizational relationship. Conflicts of interests are not necessarily 
obvious, and for an exchange partner strongly dependent on other parties, they are not easy to 
conceptualize. At the same time, the stronger party in an asymmetric relationship may find it 
difficult to acknowledge or even grasp that there is a conflict of interest in the first place, 
simply dealing with it as a more benevolent type of disagreement. This type of low intensity 
conflict with distributed interests is the focus of the current article. 
 
Regarding this type of conflict, despite its low intensity, it may still be highly damaging and 
also hold the potential to escalate into a high intensity conflict over time. One reason for this 
is that since such conflict is not clearly articulated and may not be recognized by all parties, it 
is therefore often not resolved (cf. Stahl, Maznevski, Voigt and Jonsen, 2010). Linked to this, 
Halperin et al. (2011) argue that in order to solve conflicts, they must be recognized by all 
parties. Moreover, measures to understand the situation from the other party’s perspective 
must be taken. This is often not possible in low intensity conflicts where the conflict is not 
explicated because recognition of the conflict may only be held by one of the parties. This 
reflects the findings of Distefano and Maznevski (2000) who describe the term ‘hidden 
conflicts’ and argue that this is the most difficult type of conflict because one of the parties 
may assume agreement because the other choose not to raise differences in opinions openly. 
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Blazejewski’s (2006) study suggests that low intensity conflict can result in subsidiaries’ 
ceremonial adoption of transferred practices, or, what Winter and Szulanski (2001) termed a 
faux-replication strategy, with considerable negative side-effects in terms of unnecessary 
costs, damage to internal relationships, institutionalizing of maladapted and counter-effective 
local organizational structures, perceptions, or values. On a personal level, low intensity 
conflict where anger is internalized rather than voiced more openly has been well-documented 
to increase stress and lead to physical and emotional problems (Averill, 1982). Hence, there is 
both theoretical and empirical support for assuming that low intensity conflict is damaging to 
MNC functioning as well as to individual well-being, and also that this kind of conflict is 
difficult to resolve. 
 
Method 
For this article we followed the methodological procedures suggested by Mäkelä, Kalla, and 
Piekkari (2007). Their article explains how researchers can combine different qualitative 
empirical projects and direct them towards one common research aim, using observations 
from an initial exploratory case study to prompt focused coding of data material from 
explorative and detailed case studies in other MNCs. The purpose of this process was the type 
of theory building that Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, and Paavilainen-Mäntymäki (2011) 
label inductive theory building. 
 
The preliminary observation of low intensity conflict emerged from an exploratory study of 
an English subsidiary of a Danish MNC. This corporation is labeled MNC I. After further 
exploratory studies, it became apparent that low intensity conflict might be a more general 
feature linked to power relations in MNCs. It was clear that this concept was complex and 
called for in-depth qualitative data collection due to its sensitive nature and the strong 
emotions involved. 
 
We expanded our empirical investigation to include another three Danish MNCs. 
Consequently, studies in MNC II, MNC III, and MNC IV were initiated to verify and 
elaborate on the initial findings that low power individuals’ perception of the role and actions 
of high power actors could lead to unvoiced tensions. This was executed by incorporating the 
conceptualization of low intensity conflict into on-going research and by reanalyzing and 
recoding existing interviews. The main aim has not been to compare across companies but to 
assess differences and similarities between different actors in the various units studied. We 
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assume that all subsidiaries were of lower power than the respective HQs based on the 
following criteria: All the studied MNCs were ethocentrically organized in the way that, e.g., 
expatriate personnel was always sent from the HQ to the subsidiary and not the other way 
around. Moreover, none of the included subsidiaries was involved in any type of product 
development but functioned primarily as sales and production sites. Finally, among the 
subsidiaries none of them had more than ten percent of the staff employed by HQ, and none 
of them had a financial turnover of more than fifteen percent of the domestic market. 
 
Thus, the data for this article is collected from four independent research projects conducted 
at four separate Danish MNCs. We investigated 10 subsidiaries from England, USA, 
Germany, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Singapore, and China in our four MNCs, and we were 
physically present in all subsidiaries for making interviews. The number of sites examined 
was chosen to acquire multiple voices to be used in our dataset and to assess if the low 
intensity conflict was a general theme. We included small (10 employees) and large 
subsidiaries (2500 employees) as well as different industries and countries to see if there 
would be institutional variations in the consequences and antecedences for the perception of 
conflict. However, we did not find any substantial patterns in that respect. Table 1 provides an 
overview of key figures of the included companies. 
 
***Insert table 1 *** 
 
Interviews 
In all MNCs, we used qualitative interviews loosely following a semi-structured interview 
guide. The main idea was to apply a ‘story-telling’ approach, that is, to let the interviewees 
describe their views on the issue studied as freely as possible, allowing them to interpret 
questions freely and pursue those themes that they regarded as central. Questions were 
therefore used more as a checklist and guide to ensure that central data points were collected 
across the four corporations. 
 
We specifically asked interviewees from subsidiaries to express their overall impression of 
the parent company and provide examples of how their perceptions were developed. At the 
end of each interview, interviewees were asked to share any additional information they felt 
was relevant. 
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Including different voices was achieved by interviewing individuals from all different levels 
and from both subsidiaries and HQs. We also talked to both local and expatriate personnel in 
order to get as many different voices as possible. Table 2 provides details of interviewed 
personnel. 
 
*** insert table 2 *** 
 
Analysis 
We went through an iterative comparative process between theory and data. We also 
combined within-organization analysis with between-organization analysis. We coded the 
data, classified it into emerging themes and compared our findings to existing theory. In order 
to identify low intensity conflicts in the data material, we used the qualitative analysis 
program Nvivo 10 to code for those instances where subsidiary employees described 
examples of transgressions that caused a negative change in their perceived state of the HQ-
subsidiary relationship, but which did not result in open conflict. Nvivo supports cross-case 
analysis by allowing for transposing and using code structures to be exchanged and developed 
across the case contexts. In this sense, iteration between the case data and theory-building is 
supported, helping researchers to manage complexity and strengthening the process 
validation. Afterwards we discussed the few discrepancies in the different sets of coding and 
decided on where to finally place these last text pieces. First, we conducted the within-
organization analysis of the data material in order to understand each organization as a 
coherent whole. Secondly, we searched for cross-organization patterns, comparing the 
identified topics across the four MNCs and identifying similarities and differences. Whenever 
differences in interpretation arose, we went back to the original interview texts to decide on 
the most appropriate interpretation. Working as a group of researchers allowed us to compare 
the case data in a reflexive way. 
 
Results 
In this study we have focused on relations between HQ representatives and subsidiary 
employees, as perceived by the latter, in situations where HQ is the more powerful unit. Our 
study reveals various elements of low intensity conflict in the HQ-subsidiary relationship. 
Low intensity conflicts can be relatively problematic, however, silent and subtle as they are. 
This is explained by a subsidiary employee: 
 
10 
 
When you have a problem with a decision taken by HQ, there is just a limit to 
how much noise you will make. You know at the end of the day it is their 
company. But this is also our company, and you just get really frustrated so you 
have to talk to your [local] colleagues about it. That is when you start to build 
this picture that they are all idiots. (MNC III). 
 
This quote indicates that, although conflicts are felt individually, they easily become unit-
wide – especially when power asymmetries exist. While low intensity frustration is expressed 
“below-the-line”, meaning that HQ’s will never even know about it, there is, however, some 
awareness of the problem in HQ. As one HQ manager put it: 
 
There are many subtle conflicts for sure. It is not something that people are 
really upset about here [at HQ]. But over time the small things add up to a 
dismissal here and a project that is abandoned there. But it is these little 
everyday things that do the damage. They perhaps build up more. It’s harder to 
get them aired out in relation to those who sit at a distance. But it is rare that 
there is someone who loses it in these situations. (MNC I). 
 
When asked, HQ personnel had not experienced any conflict with subsidiary staff. However, 
if they were prompted to think of any situations where disagreements were voiced, some so-
called ‘soft reactions’ were described. HQ employees sometimes had the feeling that 
subsidiary employees disagreed with a decision or a project. Reaction to proposed activities, 
as mentioned by an HQ manager, could be: ‘Oh I have to go on a business trip, and then I just 
couldn’t make it, and then finally sorry I just couldn’t do it in time and so on’(MNC I). 
Another HQ manager put it thus: ‘There are many soft ways to opt out of global project work 
without making it formal, and it is hard to do anything about’ (MNC III). It could also be a 
meeting situation where a subsidiary employee ‘behaved in a certain unhelpful way’. Hence, 
although none of the HQ informants mentioned open conflicts, they had all experienced subtle 
indications of disagreement. Yet these reactions had not caused HQ managers to change 
decisions or engage more deeply in a dialogue.  
 
While the actions by HQ managers leading to low intensity conflict behavior could be based 
on good reasoning in the overall interest of the MNC, they could, nonetheless, have a negative 
effect on relations between HQ and subsidiary employees. In this analysis we focus on 
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antecedents for low intensity conflict behavior among low power MNC actors. Focusing on 
how the actions and intentions of HQ representatives as members of powerful units can cause 
low intensity conflict behavior among subsidiary members, we propose a model consisting of 
four characteristic antecedents. Each of these gives rise to particular kinds of perceived 
conflict within the subsidiaries. While all antecedents to low intensity conflict appear to be 
related to the way high power HQ-representatives exert their influence on low power 
subsidiary employees, it is possible to distinguish between them. As depicted in figure 2, one 
dimension describes whether the HQ’s power position is used in an active or non-active 
manner (intensions). The other dimension illustrates whether HQ managers exert power that 
engages with the subsidiary representatives or not (interactions). The model presented links 
back to the conflict dimensions from Wilson and Shpall (2012) listing willful/non-willful 
action as well as activation/pacification. In our case four types of antecedents to low intensity 
conflict in MNCs can be presented: Ignoring, bypassing, assuming, and educating. 
 
***Insert figure 2 *** 
 
Ignoring 
The first category of antecedents to low intensity conflict among subsidiary representatives is 
characterized by HQ representatives’ exclusion of subsidiary employees by outright ignoring 
their needs and input. This is caused by HQ managers, in an in-direct and apparently non-
active manner, ignoring the subsidiary interest by hardly noticing the existence of the 
subsidiary and not listening to input from those working there. One HQ manager mentioned 
the physical distance to the subsidiary as a factor allowing him to unconsciously ignore his 
foreign colleagues: 
 
It is probably easier because you are here in Denmark, and you are the HQ. So 
it's easier just to close your eyes and say – well, I'm so busy focusing on my 
own. There are not so many points of contact during a day. So you can probably 
just easier say I don’t care. It would have been different if it was him who sat 
next to your office. Then you could see how frustrated he is when you meet him 
at the coffee machine. (MNC I). 
 
Another issue mentioned by subsidiary employees was the frequent verbal and written use of 
language only shared by HQ members causing feelings of being excluded. According to 
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subsidiary employees in our study, individuals from more powerful HQ units did not show 
interest in trying to learn or understand. A manager from an English subsidiary described how 
HQ representatives did not listen to their concerns about what they felt were mistaken 
expectations concerning the English market: 
  
Just because it is a big seller in Denmark, it is not necessarily the same 
here. They don’t get that. You see them throwing all these money 
around and you think to yourself – no wonder we are losing money. I 
don’t think they are really listening. (MNC 1). 
 
From the perception of subsidiary employees, one consequence of the disinterest in local 
market conditions was a lack of responsiveness to local requests for adaptations to processes 
and products. The disinterest in subsidiary conditions and views are also described by a 
subsidiary manager in another MNC: 
  
In Europe you can use cardboard for packaging. But in Asia we can’t 
use cardboard because the air is too humid and after four to six 
months it only has about half of its original stability. Still, they deliver 
products to China in cardboard packaging! I have tried to ask HQs – 
why do you do that? And the answer was – this is the way we have 
always done it. When I argued that it doesn’t work, the reply just was 
– we don’t have time for this. (MNC III). 
 
This quote illustrates an important, recurring issue in the cases. When subsidiary employees 
addressed what were important issues for them, HQ managers seemed not to listen and thus 
ended any debate. Instead, they indicated and sometimes even openly articulated that they did 
not need external input. As this closed the conversation, these situations could not develop 
into open conflict. Yet, they led to frustration among subsidiary employees. 
 
Bypassing 
Staying with the issue of HQ representative excluding subsidiary employees, the second 
category of antecedents to low intensity conflict among subsidiary representatives is caused 
by a more direct and action-oriented approach from HQ managers. Interviewees from 
subsidiaries report feeling bypassed because HQ representatives take various actions within 
13 
 
the realm of the subsidiary without involving its personnel. In such situations, subsidiary 
employees interpreted the situation as a result of HQ managers’ perception that subsidiaries 
were unnecessary intermediaries – even in the foreign market. Accordingly, HQ personnel, 
for instance, interacted directly with local markets or implemented initiatives that indirectly 
affected local market operations without asking, involving, or informing subsidiary personnel 
of their plans and actions. Such initiatives typically had the purpose of standardizing or 
streamlining activities and information at a corporate level, but subsidiary employees often 
felt disdained when HQ representatives interacted directly with local customers as in the 
example below. 
 
So the marketing department decides that they will send out direct 
mails about something. And they don’t involve us….They think it is 
good. I don’t think so. They send out a direct mail and they write the 
names on the label. And they don’t know that in Hungary we write the 
first name second and that’s a big problem because we have a lot of 
names where we have first name also in the family name. …. They 
think that the local organization is just a barrier for a very effective 
communication with our customers. (MNC III). 
 
In another case, HQ management designed and implemented a new online system aimed at 
standardizing information and processes between the MNC and local customers. In doing so, 
they ignored the fact that implementation would alter the dialogue between subsidiary 
employees and their customers by shifting a substantial part of the daily communication with 
customers to outside of the local sales rep-customer relationship. However, centralizing an 
increased amount of information at HQ level left subsidiary staff somewhat vulnerable as 
exemplified by a sales consultant: 
 
I had an appointment where I sat with some customers, and I wanted 
to show them how to order the new nice display for [name of new 
product], and the day before I had been in the online system, and it 
was okay. [At the meeting] I tried to get in to show this picture and 
how to order, but it was not in the system. I don’t know where it went 
and why, so after that I called Denmark and they said no, it is not in 
the system anymore because of this and this. And we got no 
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information before. (MNC II). 
 
Other examples of HQ representatives bypassing subsidiary staff in the attempt to optimize 
processes globally took the form of functions or processes being removed from the subsidiary 
level without either approval or involvement of the subsidiary employees. The subsidiary 
managers in turn felt that HQ managers did not understand the implications of such decisions. 
For subsidiary staff, the problem with bypassing was that the HQ initiatives, sensible or not, 
did not fit well with the daily requirements facing subsidiary managers. Since the HQ 
managers had the power and, according to themselves, good reasons for bypassing the 
subsidiary, there was not much there could be done about it in the subsidiary. Accordingly, 
instead of openly challenging HQ decision to bypass the unit, subsidiary employees exercised 
subtle resistance behavior. For example, an HQ employee mentioned that he had a feeling that 
some managers in a subsidiary were secretly sabotaging his project. 
 
Assuming 
In this section we move from conflicts caused by HQ managers excluding subsidiary 
members, and instead we focus on conflicts related to HQ representatives’ involving the 
subsidiaries, interacting with them. According to Clark and Geppert (2006), the orientations 
of HQ managers towards subsidiary managers vary significantly between positive and 
negative attitudes, and in their willingness to learn from ideas and practices that are imposed 
from outside (Clark and Geppert, 2006). While the two types of antecedents presented above 
(ignoring and bypassing) represented a disregarding and excluding HQ orientation towards 
subsidiaries, this section presents two antecedents characterized by a more involving albeit 
lecturing HQ orientation. 
 
Here, we find conflict antecedents related to non-active and active actions taken by HQ staff. 
Starting with the non-active approach, subsidiary representatives report how they on a day-to-
day basis experience that they feel HQ managers have certain assumptions about the 
subsidiary. Based on a taken-for-granted idea of the superior position of the HQ, not only in 
terms of power, but also in terms of knowledge, experience etc., HQ representatives act in a 
way that reveals a low regard for the ability of those working in the subsidiary. As 
exemplified below, according to subsidiary managers, HQ representatives seemed to have 
developed a problematic sense of infallibility thus feeling in their good right to assume the 
mistake was to be found in the subsidiary. 
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There is a great deal of organizational self-esteem in headquarters. I've 
actually received a great deal of criticism from Denmark because my 
products did not reach headquarters on time. But I just knew that it 
couldn’t be right. So we went to Denmark, and we found that the 
problem arose because headquarters did not move the products from 
the truck and onto the ramp in time. My products stood waiting 
outside the headquarter buildings. But the premise was that it must be 
the Hungarians who are the idiots… because Denmark does not make 
mistakes, so why bother to go check if anything is wrong in Denmark. 
We saw quite a number of incidents like this. (MNC III). 
 
It was clear that a number of HQ employees had a strong believe that their practices and 
values were superior to what came from the subsidiary. One HQ manager expressed it thus: 
We believe that we in HQ have a very good approach to management. We try to be role 
models to our subsidiaries (MNC III). Or as another manager mentioned to the interviewer: 
‘I sometimes feel they [subsidiary employees] are destroying the company’ (MNC I). This 
was not expressed openly to subsidiary employees, yet these indiduals had a feeling that 
they were not always appreciated. 
 
For example, without being told directly many subsidiary employees felt they were perceived 
to be doing things in the wrong way causing losses for the MNC. This is also illustrated in the 
following quote from a manager in another subsidiary: 
 
It has been a tendency that everything coming from HQ is good and 
what we have got is less good. We always try to live up to their 
standards. They fail to recognize the good thing about this company 
[the subsidiary]. (MNC I). 
 
The local personnel in one subsidiary also complained that if they raised problems or concerns 
with the business, they were given ridiculous instructions by HQ executives, like ‘just tell the 
retailers to put our product on the best shelves’ or ‘just hire the best graduates’. For subsidiary 
employees this indicated an assumption from HQ personnel that they were not skilled enough  
to see these opportunities – although they, according to subsidiary personnel, were often 
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unrealistic. Since the assumption, rightly or not, from HQ employees that their practices and 
values were better than those in the subsidiary was not laid out openly, the subsidiary 
employees’ discontent with this attitude was also not explicated. Instead a number of degrading 
jokes about HQ personnel as ‘raiding Vikings’ and ‘Luftwaffe type of guys’ were used to ‘let off 
steam’ in the subsidiaries. 
 
Educating 
Educating is the last type of antecedents to low intensity conflict that is revealed through our 
study. Educating describes an including HQ approach through which HQ representatives 
actively and explicitly call for changes in subsidiary values or practices. Subsidiary staff 
argued that more powerful HQ managers often expected them to learn from and adapt to the 
ways things were done at HQ. As described by a subsidiary manager: 
 
For headquarters the objective obviously is to spread the company 
culture across the world ... [They say]: 'We want to be global. We 
would like to work with different cultures and we also want to 
understand those different cultures. But everybody must first and 
foremost understand our common company culture. And everybody 
has to comply with that regardless of where in the world they are. 
(MNC III).  
 
This was an example of the perception that the only legitimate knowledge about ‘the way we 
do things’ in the organization was centrally located. As such, HQ representatives made great 
efforts to disseminate and teach these values and practices globally. There were numerous 
examples of how HQ managers’ efforts to align and coordinate within the organization were 
perceived by subsidiary representatives as expressions of ignorance and arrogance within the 
HQ. One subsidiary employee, for example, argued that HQ nationals seemed to have a 
certain world map which they brought along when they set out in the world. Based on that, 
according to this person, HQ representatives seemed to think that people and practices were, 
or at least should be, the same all over the world. Another example was described by a 
subsidiary manager by the following: 
 
Danish managers coming here [to the subsidiaries] tend to think that 
giving instructions to the production employees is the same in a 
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factory down here as in the factory placed just behind the headquarters 
in Denmark. [He expects] everyone in the factory to immediately 
know and understand all the instructions he is trying to convey… and 
if the Chinese do not understand, it must be him or her who is the 
problem. (MNC III). 
 
In this example, low intensity conflict arose because subsidiary employees felt that the person 
believed there was only one right way – ‘the HQ way’ – and the objective of the parent 
company manager seemed to be to teach the rest of the world. Subsidiary employees were 
perceived to be less knowledgeable than employees in the parent company, and therefore they 
should learn from the higher standards and values of HQ managers. While the active dictation 
that subsidiaries should improve on a number of points was not openly rejected by subsidiary 
personnel, HQ managers described situations where subsidiary employees silently 
counteracted suggested changes. It could be ‘making up excuses for not working fully on a 
project’,  ‘going back to their subsidiary and simply neglect the project they are working on’ 
or ‘talking bad about an initiative when they get home’ as mentioned by different HQ 
managers. 
 
Discussion 
 
Main findings 
As opposed to open conflict, low context conflicts have been argued to be rarely dealt with 
since they are often not recognized or noticed by the high power actors (Distefano and 
Maznevski, 2000; Stahl et al., 2010; Halperin et al., 2011). 
 
When examining reasons for low intensity conflict, we found four important antecedents. 
These were 1) ignoring, 2) bypassing, 3) assuming, and 4) educating. Ignoring generally 
refers to a situation where subsidiary employees got the impression that they were not being 
taken seriously or listened to by representatives of more powerful business units. Bypassing 
could be described as personnel from HQ interacting directly with the local markets and other 
local actors without involving or even informing subsidiary employees. Assuming indicates 
that high power actors perceive low power actors to be less capable of doing their job 
correctly which leads to high power actors prioritizing own choices in a taken-for-granted 
manner. Finally, educating is related to members of powerful business units actively trying to 
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change and correct lower power actor’s values and practices. All of these actions were found 
to lead to low intensity conflict behavior among individuals situated in lower power MNC 
units. Low intensity conflicts have been described in other MNC studies as below-the-line 
(Blazejewski, 2006) or silent conflicts (Bjerregaard and Klitmøller, 2016). This is something 
that can occur when the HQ is in a more powerful position and subsidiary employees cannot 
openly reject decisions made (Morrison and Milliken, 2000; Ferner et al., 2004). Still, no 
attempts have been made to explore this more systematically. 
 
Naturally, sentiments of being ignored, bypassed, or educated are common among employees 
in many organizations and may well lead to low intensity conflict also in domestic inter-unit 
interaction (cf. Kolb and Putnam, 1992). In an MNC, however, such conflicts could have even 
more severe and more long-term consequences compared to domestic organizations due to the 
organizational, national, institutional, cultural, and linguistic boundaries that may separate 
units from each other (cf. Lauring and Selmer, 2012; Gammelgaard et al., 2013; Selmer and 
Lauring, 2015). It is also clear that low intensity conflict behavior among subsidiary 
personnel is a low power actor reaction. Open confrontation seems too risky since powerful 
actors, such as HQ managers, are already not recognizing the importance of the subsidiary 
and may resort to reducing the MNC dependence on the particular subsidiary even further 
(Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). Added to this is the fact that the geographical, linguistic, 
and cultural distance will increase the chance of low intensity conflicts going unnoticed by 
such HQ managers due to reduced interaction thus leading to more long-term problems 
(Klitmøller and Lauring, 2013). 
 
Implications for theory and suggestions for future research 
Although this study is a pioneering explorative study of low intensity conflict, it has some 
straight-forward implications for theory as well as for further research within this under-
researched area. 
 
Theoretically, we contribute to the literature on MNC management by extending the existing 
notions and conceptualizations and linking these to behavioural consequences. We believe 
this approach is useful for furthering the research agenda concerned with conflict in MNCs.  
In this sense, our research extends an existing and topical debate in the literature (Bjerregaard 
and Klitmøller, 2016; Blazejewski, 2006; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005). Our study responds 
to calls for more research about conflict causes and triggers (Blazejewski, 2012). The study of 
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low intensity conflict adds to existing research by demonstrating that not only open conflict 
but also more subtle variants of conflict should be the focus of MNC research. Through the 
study of low intensity conflict, we come to know more also about the general nature of 
conflict in MNCs. In particular the dynamics between conflict, power, and perception gaps 
are important to understand (Schmid and Daniel, 2011). Accordingly, we think that further 
investigation into low intensity conflict will bring us closer to understanding what is going on 
in units when different interests and perceptions emerge and persist. We also argue that 
conflict is not something that should be conceptualized as attached to international business 
units but something that over time become unit-wide. 
 
Based on this exploratory research, implications for further research are obvious since both 
replicating and extending this exploratory investigation may be worthwhile. While this study 
has suggested some antecedents for low intensity conflict, another worthwhile future research 
endeavor would be to identify reasons for why such conflicts persist in MNCs when it is 
ostensibly in the interest of organizations to anticipate and address them. Hence, more 
research should focus on how MNCs may identify and deal with low intensity conflict. 
Furthermore, looking into differences in the four types of antecedents identified in our study 
across different types of subsidiaries would be interesting. Subsidiary role typologies suggest 
that subsidiaries with different strategic roles in the MNC should be managed differently 
(Rugman, Verbek and Yuan, 2011). Therefore, it is also to be expected that low intensity 
conflicts do not only appear in different ways and with different consequences in different 
types of subsidiaries, with implications for how to handle such conflicts. While it was not 
possible to classify our findings according to subsidiary role, we believe this should be done 
in future studies. Finally, low intensity conflict could be linked to other central themes of 
international business research, such as HQ-subsidiary knowledge sharing, and the 
contribution from subsidiaries to the innovation agenda of MNCs (cf. Birkinshaw and Hood, 
1998; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004; Phene and Almeida, 2008). 
 
Practical implications 
In a world of growing interdependence of market and resource positions, where the 
constitutional order of MNCs is no longer clearly dictated by members of the HQ, 
understanding and countering processes that may cause organizational tension are welcomed. 
The findings suggest that companies may want to monitor closely and try to counteract 
negative outcomes of low intensity conflicts. This may be crucial, since the negative emotions 
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among low power unit members may otherwise over time become substantial and difficult to 
alleviate as they assume a unit-wide character. 
 
The literature on MNC conflicts in relation to the standardization vs. localization discussion 
(e.g. Solberg, 2000) mention that HQs actors should try acquire more knowledge of the local 
situation and develop an esprit de corps throughout the whole organization. This, however, 
may not necessarily solve low intensity conflict if it is not recognized. Increasing the 
awareness in high power units of the negative emotions that could be the result of ignoring, 
bypassing, assuming, and educating, may be a first step towards avoiding them (cf. Halperin 
et al. 2011). Often, low intensity conflicts are not acknowledged by powerful individuals due 
to the power asymmetry. Thus, representatives of influential MNC units need to be sensitive 
towards signs of discontent and disagreement from other units’ employees and may start 
questioning whether all low intensity conflicts simply reflect conceptual gaps or conflicts of 
interests. Being in a dominating power position, it can be tempting for HQ managers to 
overlook subtle signs of conflict behavior in other units. This, however, can have long-term 
negative consequences. As such, all signs of subtle conflict behavior should be taken 
seriously and dealt with openly. 
 
As predicted by the contact hypothesis (e.g. Amir, 1969), dialogue and increased interaction 
between units could have positive consequences. According to the contact hypothesis, more 
frequent communication diminishes the negative inter-group perceptions that may build up 
among discontent group members. This could be related to Solberg’s (2000) suggestion that 
centralization should be a cooperative achievement made in a dialogue between HQ and 
subsidiary representatives. Moreover, some MNC studies have shown that boundary spanners 
are useful in reducing inter-unit open conflict (e.g. Schotter and Beamish, 2011). Boundary 
spanners such as expatriates may be particularly useful for identifying and solving hidden low 
intensity conflicts because they often have gained the trust of members in both units. 
 
For MNC managers in subsidiaries and in HQ units there are important insights from this 
study as well. Conceptualizing, labelling, and explaining behavior which can be perceived by 
others as demeaning and/or arrogant can make it easier to recognize and address such 
behaviors as well as take measures against their consequences. Hence their negative 
consequences can more easily be identified and taken into account in the ongoing process of 
coping with low-level conflicts. 
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Finally, it also has to be recognized that many of the actions performed by e.g. powerful HQ 
representatives, which may result in low intensity conflict behavior by subsidiary personnel, 
are performed for good reasons – for example with regard to global integration or 
centralization efforts. In such occasions, HQ representatives should not bluntly ignore or 
discard subsidiary quarrels but should explain more precisely why certain decisions need to be 
taken and take the debate with the locals openly. 
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Figure 1. Conflict intensity and behavioral drivers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Antecedents for low intensity conflict: Actions and intensions 
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Table 1. Company data 
 
 
Number of 
business units 
Staff Turnover (Euros) Industry Studied 
subsidiary 
location/ 
employees 
MNC I 30 16,000 7 Billion Food 
processing 
England/2,500 
MNC II 40  2,000 100 Million Furniture Germany/10, 
Italy/10, 
USA/10 
MNC III 80 16,000 2.3 Billion Building 
supplies 
Hungary/3000, 
China/2800, 
USA/1700 
Singapore/600 
MNC IV 40 10,000 5 Billion Building 
supplies 
Poland/2500 
Germany/1000 
 
 
 
Table 2. Interviews 
Interviews MNC I MNC II MNC III MNC IV 
Subsidiary employees 86 17 25 3 
HQ personnel 9 5 14 4 
Total number of 
interviews (n =170) 
95 22 36 7 
 
 
